Aspects of Egyptian Foreign Policy in the 18th Dynasty in Western Asia and Nubia

One of the most fascinating periods of Near Eastern history is the liberation of Egypt from "Hyksos" control, the beginnings of Egypt's New Kingdom or Empire period, and the concomitant Middle Bronze-Late Bronze transition in Canaan. That a military presence of some kind played a central role in Egypt's relationship to the Levant is well recognized, but often over-emphasized to the exclusion of other aspects of Egypt's foreign policy. Furthermore, there is a tendency among scholars interested in Syro-Palestinian history and archaeology to forget that Egypt had a second major theater of operation in LB I, viz. Nubia. The purpose of this paper is to explore some of the oft forgotten aspects of Egypt's foreign policy in Western Asia, concentrating on the period 1550-1400 B.C., the reigns of Ahmose from Amenhotep II, the LB I period in Syria-Palestine. Additionally, the differences between Egypt's foreign policy with Nubia and the Levant will be explored and possible reasons for the contrasting models will be proposed.

I. The Military Priorities of the Fledgling Dynasty

The New Kingdom was born as a result of years, if not a couple decades of military action against the Delta and Avaris by the Theban kings, Seqenenre Ta'a II, Kamose and Ahmose. In his stela, Kamose claims that he, Egypt's king, controlled only upper Egypt, while being squeezed from the north by the "Prince of Retenu" and from the south by the Kushites. In a communiqué intercepted by Theban troops in the Libyan Desert, Apophis, the Hyksos king, requested assistance from his Kushite ally because of Kamose's attacks on the Delta:

Aawaserre, Son of Re, Apophis greets my son, the ruler of Kush. Why did you accede as ruler without informing me? Do you see what Egypt has done against me? The ruler who is in it, Kamose the Mighty, given life, is assailing me upon my soil -- although I did not attack him -- the very same way he did against you. It is in order to torment these two lands that he picks them out. Both my land and yours he has ravaged. Come north! Don't blanch (?)! Since he is occupied with me here, there is no one who can be opposed to you in this Egypt. Since I won't let him go until you arrive, we can then divide up the towns of this Egypt, and [both] our [lands] will be happy again.3

The Hyksos ruler's dispatch, if it is taken at face value, reveals that Kamose had earlier on attacked Nubia and that if the Kushites joined the Hyksos in thwarting the Theban attacks, they could have a share of Upper Egypt. This latter factor may explain why the Ahmose and his successors adopted an aggressive posture towards Canaan and Nubia in the early 18th Dynasty. This policy is in view in King Ahmose's campaign to Sharuhen in southern Canaan in pursuit of the fleeing Hyksos and by an even more extensive incursion into Nubia, and from other campaigns recorded in Commander Ahmose Si Abena's tomb biography. Nubia appears to be of greatest concern to the early New Kingdom pharaohs to judge from the greater frequency of references to campaigns in Nubia over against Levantine ones in historical texts. In his report of the activities in Canaan, Commander Ahmose records just two lines (15-16a), whereas the invasion of Kush is recorded in eight lines (16b-24a), followed immediately by another sortie to Nubia under Amenhotep I which occupies six lines in the biography (24-29). There is no reference in the biography to any military action in Western Asia during the twenty-one year reign of Amenhotep I (1525-1504 B.C.). Only in Thutmose I's reign (1504-1492 B.C.) does he mention a campaign to Western Asia, but this comes after yet another Nubian expedition.7 The evidence provided by this biography coupled with that of another military officer, Ahmose Pen-Nekhbet,8 suggests that Nubia was the main focus of Egyptian military activity for the period from 1550-1504, and not the Levant. In fact there is a dearth of textual evidence for Egyptian military activity in Western Asia until Thutmose I's year two Naharin campaign documented in the Tombos Stela of regnal year two, but there is no mention of military activity in Canaan.9 The absence of evidence does not mean that there was no military measures taken against Levantine cities between Ahmose's Sharuhen campaign and Thutmose I's march to the Euphrates. However, the lack of evidence should at least make historians and Syro-Palestinian archaeologists cautious when trying to determine the cause of the demise of the Middle Bronze Age in Canaan.
Traditionally, Syro-Palestinian archaeologists have believed that the MB IIC period came to a violent end with the expulsion of the Hyksos from Egypt and subsequent Egyptian military action in Canaan. Thus a nice clean line could be drawn between the Middle and Late Bronze ages around 1550 B.C. An earlier generation of Egyptologists thought along similar lines. John Wilson, for instance, believed that "there is evidence that the Egyptians were not content to drive the Hyksos out of Egypt but felt compelled to pursue them with vindictive fury for more than a century." This understanding was adopted and amplified more recently by James Weinstein who declared: That the Egyptians were responsible for most if not all the destructions of the MB cities of Palestine has long been a basic assumption in virtually all reconstructions of Palestinian history and archaeology of this period.

Weinstein then offered an archaeological survey of no less than twenty sites from Tell el 'Ajjul in the south to Taanach in the north whose MB destructions he attributed to Egyptian forces in the early 18th Dynasty. In fact, recent surveys in the hill country of Ephraim by Israel Finkelstein and Manasseh by Adam Zertal have shown that the destruction of MB sites is even greater than previously believed. So there is no doubt that the end of the Middle Bronze Age in Canaan was turbulent indeed.

In an article in Levant 21 (1989) I questioned the grounds for connecting all of these destructions to the Egyptian military because Egyptian records could not support this conclusion, and on the grounds that the dating all these destructions to such a short period of time simply could not be demonstrated by the ceramic and stratigraphic evidence as Weinstein (and others) believed. In arguing for a more minimalist view of Egypt's destructive actions in Canaan, I was in good company as Donald Redford, William Shea and Piotr Bienkowski were also casting doubts about Egypt's role. Another reason for viewing Egypt's role in Canaan to be less aggressive than others have thought is my belief that Egypt's foreign policy before Thutmose III towards Palestine and Nubia resorted to earlier, Middle Kingdom models, to which we now must turn.

II. Egyptian Foreign Policy in Nubia and the Levant before Thutmose III

It must be admitted that our knowledge of Egypt's foreign policy with western Asia in the Middle Kingdom is uncertain, but in Nubia the picture is clearer. From the dawn of Egyptian history, there is evidence of an aggressive policy towards Nubia. Egyptian interest in Nubia can be traced back to the 1st Dynasty. Kings Hor-Aha and Djer of Dynasty 1 conducted military raids into Nubia, with the latter leaving a rock inscription near Wadi Halfa in the Second Cataract region. During the Old Kingdom, trade missions in Nubia were frequent, judging from the biographies of officials who represented the Crown. Weni and Harkuf are certainly among the most celebrated and they remind us of the primarily economic nature of the missions that occasionally required military action in order to protect Egypt's vital interests. During the Middle Kingdom, a full-scale annexation of Lower Nubia was systematically achieved by the Senuserts and Amenemhets as evidenced by the building of thirteen forts from the end of the First Cata- ract to the Second, the southern-most being at Semna. These massive structures required considerable manpower to build and an administrative network to sustain. Senusert III's Semna stelae make it clear that Egypt considered this fort to mark its southern frontier. The impressive Egyptian military presence would leave no question who was in control of Kush and it served to protect strategic economic links with the Kerma culture to the south with whom there was brisk trade.

Redford has argued that products, resources, and available manpower were the principal reasons for Egypt's presence in Nubia. William Y. Adams and Barry Kemp similarly regard economic factors as a motivation for Egypt's intense interest in and exploitation of Nubia during the Middle Kingdom. "Acculturation Colonialism" is the term used to describe Egypt's policy in Nubia in the 12th Dynasty, because, as Stuart Tyson Smith notes, "Nubia was brought completely within the Egyptian social, economic religious and administrative systems." This was also the case in the New Kingdom as reflected by the administrative structure used in Nubia. Based upon official titles, David O'Connor has detailed the various administrative and military offices during the New Kingdom in Nubia and Egypt, (Figure 1) and they illustrate the difference between the colonial and the imperial models used in Nubia and Syria-Canaan respectively. The crown's top official in Nubia was the imy-ry hstory, s3-nsw ks. "The Overseer of Southern Foreign Lands, the King's son of Kush." "Viceroy of Kush" is typically how this office rendered by Egyptologists. Under the Viceroy were the Deputy (idnw) of Wawat (northern Nubia) and the Deputy (idhnw) of Kush (southern Nubia), and the Battalion Commander (hry pdt n Ks), beneath which were the Egyptian h3py-r5 (Mayors) of administrative centers and forts and the indigenous chiefs (wprt). In the Levant, on the other hand, the local vassal kings (wprt) reported directly to the "Overseer of All Northern Foreign Lands," as did the Battalion Commanders. (Figure 1)

While the different models appear to result from distinct histories of dealing with Egypt's southern and northern neighbors, they also differ because the two respective cultures were significantly distinct. The local population of Nubia was tribal, less centralized, and thus a colonial model - which required more Egyptian administration - was better suited. Syria-Canaan, on the other hand, was more urban, socially stratified, and had educated and literate bureaucrats, which lent itself more to Egypt employing an imperial model for controlling the region. The colonial model however, was more costly to operate, whereas the imperial model, with its greater reliance on local princes to administer Pharaoh's affairs, was more cost efficient and thus more economically beneficial to Egypt. One wonders if it was not the abundance of gold produced in Nubia that made the colonial model economically viable. Despite Egypt's military and economic prowess in both the Middle and New Kingdoms, it seems...
unlikely that a colonial model could have been utilized in both regions.

Another possible reason why the colonial model was employed in Nubia is because the Nile directly connected Egypt to Nubia. Logistically, a colonial system would be easier to establish and control in Nubia because the Nile facilitated travel and communication between the two lands. Although the distance between the Delta capitals and Canaan were closer than Thebes was to Kush, transportation and interaction between Egypt and Canaan was impeded by the long desert track between the east delta and Gaza, Rapha, and Sharuhen, the southernmost Canaanite cities. Alternatively, sea travel was required connect with the Levant, which was more hazardous and never favored by the Egyptians even though they had an active navy. Thus, it might be suggested that geographical considerations likewise played a role in determining the different systems for controlling subject states.

I concur with Smith who demonstrated that Pharaohs Ahmose, Amenhotep I, and Thutmos I concentrated on Nubia in order to reestablish the policy that had flourished during the glory days of the 12th Dynasty.xxxii This suggestion in no way is at odds with Redford's idea that early 18th

Evidence of theses military structures come to light. During the 1970s Eliezer Oren identified 80 New Kingdom sites of outposts for the Ramesside period. Not until recent years has

It was once common to think that Egypt had

Another possible reason why the colonial model was

In order to return Nubia to Egyptian hegemony as it had been during the Middle Kingdom, the Kushite kingdom that had developed during the 2nd Intermediate period had to be dismantled. And, no doubt, fear of infiltration and aggression towards Egypt must also have been a concern of the 18th Dynasty Pharaohs after the Kushite's had colluded with the Hyksos against Thebes during the 17th Dynasty.

The return to the 12th Dynasty colonial model is supported by two lines of evidence. First, some of the abandoned Middle Kingdom forts, like the ones at Buhen and Askut, were refurbished and used during the 18th Dynasty, and new ones, such as Dorginarti, were apparently built for the first time. Secondly, inscriptions dating as early as Kamose's reign place Egyptian troops at Buhen and Arminna, perhaps as a result of the campaign mentioned in Apophis's intercepted communiqué to the Kushite king. Military titles associated with Kush are attested already in the reign of Ahmose, e.g. "Commander of Buhen," "King's Son of Kush" (i.e. Viceroy), and during Amenhotep I's reign, the title was expanded to include "Overseer of Southern Lands." As time went on, an elaborate administrative structure was put in place to oversee Egypt's affairs in Nubia, which relied principally upon Egyptian officials and not local Nubians as noted above. (Figure 1)

As in the case with Nubia, Egypt's economic interests in Canaan can be traced back to the 1st Dynasty, to judge from vessels with the serekh of Narmer found at several sites in southern Canaan. The Horus names of other 1st Dynasty monarch's, viz., Djet, Den and Anedjib, are found on seal impressions at En-Besor. And and abundance of Egypt wares and local copies of Egyptian ceramics have also been discovered in recent years at Tel Erani, Tel Maahaz and Tel Halil indicating extensive trade with the Early Bronze culture of southern Canaan. Den's year docket, "the first occasion of smiting easterners," may represent an example of the type of punitive raid designed to protect trade routes. During the Old Kingdom, Egypt's policy toward the Levant can be described as being economically based with only periodic military coercion being used when Egypt's interests were threatened. It was once common to think that Egypt had established an empire in the Levant during the 12th Dynasty, but evidence for this is lacking. However, Byblos certainly had a unique relationship with Egypt that was economically beneficial for both partners. Weinstein describes the association as "a special economic and political relationship" that endured throughout most of the 2nd Millennium B.C.. The term "colony" may be fitting for Byblos, the same is not true, however, for the rest of Syria-Palestine as Redford observes: the pharaohs of the 12th and 13th Dynasties view hither Asia and the Levant as theirs to exploit to the full. On the other hand, it is equally clear that we cannot speak of "empire" in the formal sense. Titles denoting colonization, occupation, and military surveillance are certainly known in the Middle Kingdom, but they turn up mainly in the Nubian theater.

New evidence for Egypt's economic relations with the Levant in the 12th Dynasty is found on the recently published blocks from Memphis that contains annals of Amenemhet II. No forts to control trade and the local populations have been found in Canaan like those in Nubia until the LB II period, which coincides with the Ramesside era. During this period modest sized (compared with the Nubian forts) Egyptian administrative centers, called "Governor's Residencies," began to appear throughout Canaan. Some scholars are beginning to question whether these structures in fact housed Egyptian officials. Carolyn Higginbothom, for instance, has argued that they belonged to Canaanite rulers or administrators who Egyptianized their architecture so as to look Egyptian for reasons of status. While this is an interesting possibility, surely the Egyptians had some sort of administrative centers that they had constructed throughout Canaan to serve as bases for overseeing their economic and security concerns. If the so called "governor's residencies" did not serve these purposes in the LB II period, what did?

Egyptian forts, however, are known from texts to have existed along North Sinai between Egypt's frontier and Gaza. The battle reliefs of Seti I at Karnak and Pup. Anas
tasi provide the names and the sequence of these military outposts in the Ramesside period. Not until recent years has evidence of theses military structures come to light. During the 1970s Eliezer Oren identified 80 New Kingdom sites of various sizes along the military road to Canaan. He briefly excavated two military outposts in the El-Arish area, Bir el-'Abd (site BEA 10) and Haruba (sites A-289 and A-345). The fortress uncovered at site A-289 was relatively small, measuring only 2500 sq. meters. Between 1972 and 1982, Trude Dohan uncovered an Amarna through Ramesside period fort at Deir el-Balah, 13 km. south of Gaza city. As a consequence of the excavations of these Israeli scholars, the eastern end of the military road and its network of forts are being clarified.
Not until the mid-1980s was a fort discovered on the Egyptian side this route. Dr. Mohamed Abd el-Maksoud is the excavator of at Tell Hebua, located about 14 km. north east of Qantara East. His team has uncovered a massive military establishment. The settlement dates to at least the 14th Dynasty, according to an inscription bearing the cartouche of Nehesy. There is also evidence of a Hyksos presence, including a horse burial, and during the New Kingdom this fort flourished. This site is almost certainly Tjaru, Egypt's frontier town, known as the launching point for the military campaigns of Thutmose III to Megiddo, Seti I to Canaan and Ramesses II against the Hittites.

In 2000, the East Frontier Archaeological Project, which this writer directs, discovered another fort located 7 km. SE of Hebua at Tell el-Borg. Complete with an impressive moat, this fort went through three building phases the earliest of which was likely constructed during the reign of Thutmose III, while the two later phases were built in the late 18thDynasty and Ramesside period respectively. (Plate 1) Thus the Egyptian military presence between Egypt and Canaan during the LB I-II periods is beginning to emerge. Regrettably, this new information does not shed new light on directly Egypt's foreign policy in the Levant. Nevertheless, it does illustrate that from the time of Thutmose III onwards the Egyptians invested considerable capital and manpower to control North Sinai. Consequently, it is hard to believe that they did no have numerous military and administrative centers strategically located throughout the Levant.

The recent and surprising discovery of an early 18th Dynasty citadel at Tell el-Dabca by the Austrian expedition is shedding new light on 18th Dynasty Levantine foreign policy. Manfred Bietak thinks that this structure was built within the Hyksos period city of Avaris, and dates its establishment to the reign of Ahmose. The fortification appears to have been built as a base of operation for launching the military campaigns of Ahmose and his successors into Canaan and Syria. Analysis of the ceramic remains from nearby storage facilities point to the time of Thutmose III (1479-1425 B.C.) as a terminus for the usage of the fort. Clearly this fort served as a military base for early 18th Dynasty, and subsequently Tjaru appears to have replaced it as a staging base for Levantine operations from the time of Thutmose III onwards.

Evidence for Egyptian military action in Canaan from the time of Ahmose to Thutmose III is sparse indeed. Despite the three year siege of Sharuhen there is nothing to suggest that Egyptian troops went about demolishing MB II cities, especially given the scope of Egyptian military and building operations in Nubia. It appears that Egypt was able to flex its muscles and demonstrate to the Levantine city-states that Pharaoh once again was their master without having to conquer the entire land. T.G.H. James suggested this scenario many years ago:

After the capture of Avaris, the logical next move for Amosis was to secure the safety of Egypt's eastern frontier from the threat of retaliatory incursions by the Asiatics. By the capture of Sharuhen he achieved this end, and at the same time demonstrated to the Asiatics that Egypt was again ruled by an active king. Redford too believes that Ahmose was able to secure the allegiance of much of Canaan without the expense of extended military activities. He maintains that "Ahmose could hope to extend a dampening influence on any unruly elements of the Palestinian hill-country, without the expense of a full-scale take-over of the latter regions."

Policy Changes under Thutmose III

Not until Thutmose III's first campaign in 1457 B.C. does textual evidence emerge that enables us to capture a glimpse of Egypt's policy towards Canaan. It suggests that Egypt was moving towards an imperial model of domination. The texts, especially the Annals of Thutmose III, offer hints of Egypt's early policies. From the early 18th Dynasty, Egypt considered Syria-Palestine to be a vassal state. Loyalty to Pharaoh was expected. The Prince of Kadesh's plot, whether prompted by Mitanni or not, that resulted in the rebellion at Megiddo, and prompted Thutmose III's campaign, was viewed by the Egyptians as a challenge to her hegemony, and signaled the need for a firmer and clearer policy. The opening lines of Thutmose III's annals indicates that the Egyptian garrison (hwyr) that had apparently been some where in Canaan, possibly Megiddo, was forced out and took refuge in Sharuhen, a city beyond the sphere of the rebellion's control. This admission of re-deployment demonstrates that prior to the Megiddo campaign, there was some sort of ongoing military presence in Canaan. After the surrender of the Megiddo coalition, the Annals report that "his majesty appointed the princes anew for [every city]." The use of n-n, "anew" suggests that a system of loyal vassals had been in place, although, whether this arrangement had been formalized or assumed by the Egyptians is not clear. But with Thutmose III the policy became normative.First, the rebel leaders had to take an oath of loyalty (sdj-ty) "not to repeat evil against Men-Kheper-Re," and they presented the king with tribute. Second, as will be seen below, princes of the vassal kings were brought to Egypt for education and indoctrination.
Whatever the nature of economic relations between the two regions was before Thutmose III is unclear, but, after the Megiddo campaign the picture begins to emanate. Upon the surrender of Megiddo, the Annals state:78 Now the fields were divided into plots and assigned to royal agents in order to take care of their harvest. A list of the harvest which was taken away for his majesty from the fields of Megiddo. 207,300 [† X], 103 apart from gleanings taken by the army of his majesty.80 Utilizing Egyptian agents in overseeing the harvest and storage of grain apparently became a central part of the Egyptian policy in Canaan. The objective, apparently, was to provide food for Egyptian troops and horses when campaigning in the region. Shmuel Ahituv has suggested that grains going to Egypt as tribute were only token amounts, with the balance staying in the region.81 Some of the Amarna letters report to Pharaoh that preparations were under way for the next campaign, implying that necessary materials were in place, along with administrators who supervised such preparations.82

For the 19th Dynasty, or LB II period, Egyptian administrative centers at sites like Tell el-Ajjul, Tell el-Farah (S), Deir el- Balah, Tell Mor, Aphek, and Beth Shan may have served as storage centers.83 But for earlier periods, archaeological evidence in the Levant is limited indeed.84 Beth Shean, however, appears to have housed an Egyptian garrison from the time of Thutmose III through the Ramesside period.85 Megiddo, Taanach, Gaza and Sharuhen may have housed Egyptian troops during the LB I period, but no identifiable Egyptian buildings like those of the LB II period are attested.86 How the Egyptians administered their affairs in Canaan during the LB I period remains uncertain; however, new insights into the economic strategies are now becoming clear. A careful investigation by Edward Bleiberg of the key terms inw and bik in Thutmose III’s Annals has revealed a two-tier system of commodity exchange between Western Asia and Egypt.87 Bik(w) clearly refers to a type of taxation, while the meaning of inw has been less certain.88 Historically inw has been rendered ’tribute’.89 Bleiberg’s study of the use of these terms, however, shows that these terms were not interchangeable and actually were regionally specific in application. For instance, bik is used for goods coming from Kush, Wawat and Lebanon, whereas inw is applied to materials from Retenu, Assyria, Wartjet, Djahy, Genbut, Hatti, Isy, Alalakh and Tinay.90 Furthermore, Bleiberg has shown that some of the countries which were not invaded by Thutmose send inw, viz. Assyria, Genbut, Senger, Hatti, Issy and Alalakh, and inw tends to come from individuals representing an area while bik explicitly comes from a region.91 The distinction between the two categories suggests that personal and impersonal transactions were taking place. Bleiberg associates this practice with what historical economist George Dalton has identified as a fundamental difference between ancient economies and present-day counterparts. Dalton saw ancient economies resulting from “a fusion of social and economic institutions ... There is no awareness of the 'economy' as a distinct set of practices apart from social institutions. Transactions of material goods in marketless economies are expressions of social obligations.”92 This concept leads Bleiberg to conclude that inw “is a technical term which must be translated uniformly in this text whether it comes from a conquered or independent prince,”93 signifying that Pharaoh had an “inw relationship” with the donor. These products, in turn, become the king’s personal property. In other words, a “gift-giving” economy existed. That a “gift-giving” economy prevailed in the Near East during the second half of the second millennium is evident. Jac Janssen has contributed significantly to our understanding of this practice within Egypt.94 Meanwhile, Mario Liverani95 and Zipporah Cochavi-Rainey96 have investigated this practice in the Near East during the Amarna period. Bleiberg’s studies have shown that this practice is well-attested in earlier periods.

Bik, Bleiberg argues, was brought under centralized control and then redistributed by the crown. It comes from Nubia and Lebanon, while inw does not.97 Interestingly, these countries had been Egyptian colonies in the Middle Kingdom, and administered by Egyptians. The same was not true for Canaan and Syria where a system of native princes overseeing Pharaoh’s affairs was employed instead of Egyptian officials. In other words, the terms inw and bik seem to reflect the different models of control used in Western Asia, the imperial, versus the colonial in Nubia.

IV. Thutmose III's Diplomacy

Thutmose III (1457-1425 B.C.) initiated the practice of bringing the princes of subject kings of western Asia to Egypt to be trained in Egyptian ways so as to prepare them to replace their fathers upon their death. This policy is mentioned for the first time in the Annals in an inw list from Retenu (Syria-Pal estine) were it records:

Now the children of the chieftains and their brothers are brought in order to be hostages of Egypt. Now if anyone of these chieftains died, then his majesty will have his son go to assume his throne.98

References to the presence of the sons of Syro-Canaanite kings in pharaoh’s court, and possible allusions to the practice inaugurated by Thutmose III, are found in some of the Amarna correspondence of the 14th century. Aziru of Amurrum, in order to show his loyalty to Egypt says “I herewith give [my] sons as 2 att[endants] and they are to do what the k[ing, my lord] orders” (EA 156:9-14).99 Meanwhile, Arasha of Kumiud claimed: “Truly I send my own son to the king, my lord ...” (EA 199:15-21).100 Jerusalem’s king, Abdu-Heba, maintains that his legitimacy as king was due to his appointment by pharaoh, stating “neither my father nor my mother put me in this place, but the strong arm of the king brought me into my father’s house” (EA 286:10-15).101 From this statement it might be inferred that Abdu-Heba had been a prince schooled in Egypt before his appointment to the kingship of Jerusalem. Perhaps in the absence of a son, or one old enough to be sent to Egypt, a king’s brother might be sent to Egypt instead, as Biryawaza of Damascus reports: “[I] herewith [s]end [m]y brother [t]o you” (EA 194:28-32).102
In addition, the Amarna Letters, and other New Kingdom documents, abound with references to daughters of kings from the Levant, Anatolia and Mesopotamia going to Egypt to marry the pharaohs in order to seal diplomatic relations. This practice also appears to have been introduced by Thutmose III in the New Kingdom and it flourished down into the Ramesside age. The "daughter of the Prince of Retenu" stands at the head of an inv list from Thutmose's 40th regnal year; she may have been sent for a diplomatic marriage. A Theban tomb revealed the burial of three princesses with foreign names from the time of Thutmose III who may have come to Egypt for such marriages.

V. Deportation Policies

Small numbers of prisoners of war are mentioned on the biographical texts of the early 18th Dynasty, but there are no extant royal inscriptions before those of Thutmose III that indicate the scale of deportations from Syria-Palestine. The Annals carefully document the figures. 340 is the figure given for the number of prisoners taken to Egypt after the fall of Megiddo. The documentation of prisoners-of-war in subsequent years is recorded with regularity. For year thirty, 36 men and 181 male (Hm) and female (Hmt) servants are listed; year thirty-one - 492 prisoners-of-war; year thirty-two - 66 male and female servants with their children, and from the same year, 513 male and female servants were received as tribute from Retenu; year thirty-three - 602 male and female servants came as tribute from Retenu; year thirty-four - 50 prisoners of war and 522 male and female servants are listed as tribute from Retenu. During nearly 20 years of recorded annals, which are by no means complete, thousands of people from Canaan and Syria were transported to Egypt as prisoners-of-war or as gifts from various kings.

While no extensive annalistic records have survived for Thutmose III's successors, a number of inscriptions bear witness to a continuation of the policy of deporting Semitic speaking peoples from western Asia to Egypt. Amenhotep II's year seven Memphis stela records two sorties into the Levant. Figures given for captured peoples are 550 Maryanu (elite Hurrian warriors), 240 wives of Maryanu, 640 Canaanites, 232 children of princes, 323 daughters of the princes, 270 concubines of the princess, with the total being 2,214 individuals. The numbers from his second campaign are even higher, 127 chieftains of Retenu, 179 chieftain's brothers, 3600 'Apiru, 15,200 Shasu-Bedouin, 36,300 Syrians (H3rw), 15,070 from Nagasu, and their families 30,652, with a grand total of 89,600. Interestingly, the figure given for the total is incorrect. Adding all the individual figures, the sum is actually 101,128. Because this total is so high its reliability has been questioned. Anthony Spalinger, for instance, thinks the figures should be taken seriously and reflects a shift in policy from a selective deportation used by Amenhotep II's predecessors, to mass deportation. He compares this practice that used by the Hittite monarch Mursilis II, and Middle and Neo-Assyrian kings. The remainder of the 18th Dynasty saw only limited Egyptian military activity in Canaan and Syria, a testimony to Thutmose III and Amenhotep II's effectiveness in controlling the lands from Egypt to the Euphrates, and perhaps because of Amenhotep's mass deportation program was intended to break down resistance.

VI. Concluding Thoughts

This paper has attempted to draw attention to some of the other aspects of Egyptian foreign policy in the Levant and Nubia during the New Kingdom or Late Bronze Age. It is suggested that the policy from Ahmose to Hatshepsut was not clearly developed (quasi-imperial?), and followed earlier, Middle Kingdom models that were largely economically based with periodic military measures being taken to support it. The means of controlling Western Asia from the days of Ahmose through Hatshepsut was very different than those methods used in Nubia for the same period. The Kadesh inspired rebellion against Egypt at Megiddo was the wake up call that prompted Thutmose III to adopt new and more aggressive imperial measures to regulate the region through tighter control of local princes, having regular shows of force, and establishing treaties and marriage alliances. The failures of Amarna period diplomacy undoubtedly prompted a further tightening of control by the establishment of LB II period "residencies." These Egyptian administrative centers, it might be suggested, were designed to oversee both military and economic interests in the region. In so doing, the Ramesside strategy in Canaan may have been an attempt at to establish on a smaller scale the colonial model that had been so effective in controlling Nubia.
Notes

1 It is with great pleasure that I present this paper to my teacher, mentor, and friend, Dr. Donald B. Redford on this special occasion. He was my professor in a number of courses, both in the areas of Egyptian History and Egyptian texts. My interest in the subject presented in this paper grew directly out of his classes and reading some of these texts together. Additionally, Dr. Redford was gracious enough to include me on the East Karnak excavations of the Akhenaten Temple Project in 1975 and 1977. So I am also indebted to him for teaching me how to excavate in Egypt. Additionally, between 1980 and 1982 he was reader for my dissertation. Finally, he was the one who encouraged me to excavate in North Sinai when he arranged for my participation in the As-Salam irrigation project. While I only touch on our discoveries at Tell el-Borg from the 2000 and 2001 seasons, they have much to say about Egypt's defense system during the 18th Dynasty. My heart felt thanks to Donald Redford for his encouragement and support over the past 30 years.

This paper is an updated and reworked version of one presented at Mid-West Regional Meeting of the American Schools of Oriental Research and Society of Biblical Literature, February 17, 1997 at Wheaton College and for the American Research Center in Egypt Annual Meeting at U.C.L.A., April 25, 1998.

2 For a review of the evidence, see the writer’s “Reconsidering Egypt's Part in the Termination of the Middle Bronze Age in Palestine,” Levant 21 (1989) 188.


5 Urk. IV, 5.4-14.

6 The only possible evidence for military activity during the reign of Amenhotep I is found on some blocks which may simply indicate that some tribute came from Canaan. See Redford’s study of these texts in “A Gate Inscription from Karnak and Egyptian Involvement in Western Asia during the Early 18th Dynasty,” JAOS 99 (1979) 270-287. The only possible evidence for military activity during the reign of Amenhotep I is found on some blocks which may simply indicate that some tribute came from Canaan. See Redford’s study of these texts in “A Gate Inscription from Karnak and Egyptian Involvement in Western Asia during the Early 18th Dynasty,” JAOS 99 (1979) 270-287.


8 Pen-Nekhbet lists the campaigns in which he was involved. They include, one to Djahy (Canaan) during the reign of Ahmose, two to Nubia during the reign of Amenhotep I, one each to Nubia and Naharin under Thutmose I, and a battle against Shasu-Bedouin (probably in North Sinai or the Negev) by Thutmose II (Urk. IV, 35-36).


10 For a review of this position, and recent defenses of it, see Levant 21 (1989) 181.

11 The Culture of Ancient Egypt (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1951) 168.


13 BASOR 241 (1981) 2-5

14 The results of these surveys were recently treated together in a study on the end of the MBA by Nadav Na’aman, “The Hurrians and the End of the Middle Bronze Age in Palestine,” Levant XXVI (1994) 175-187.


17 Jericho in the Late Bronze Age (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1986) 127-128.

18 This point has been made by David O’Connor in Bruce Trigger, et. al. Ancient Egypt: A Social History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983) 207.


22 For the text, see Kurt Sethe, fgyptische Lesestcke (Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1924) 257-258; translation in Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature Vol. 1, 118-120.


24 Egypt and Canaan in the New Kingdom (ed. S. Ahituv; Beer Sheva: Ben Gurion University of the Negev, 1990) 2.
27 Askut in Nubia, 9-10.  
29 "The Overseer of All Northern Lands" directed Egypt's affairs in Canaan and Syria (See Trigger, Ancient Egypt a Social History, 208).  
30 Smith, Askut in Nubia, 10-12.  
31 Smith, Askut in Nubia, 10-12.  
33 Askut in Nubia, 137. Smith offers a very helpful map showing the progression of Egypt's re-conquest of Nubia during this period (Askut in Nubia, 138).  
34 Egypt and Canaan in the New Kingdom, 2.  
38 Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs, 169-170. Further on Egypt's expansion in Nubia in the early 18th Dynasty, see T. Säve-Söderbergh, Ägypten und Nubien: ein Beitrag zur Geschichte altÄgyptischer Außenpolitik (Lund: 1941) 141ff.  
43 BM 5586. For a photograph see E.S. Hall, The Pharaoh Smiles his Enemies (Münchner Ägyptologische Studien Heft 44, 1986) fig. 9.  
48 Egypt, Canaan, and Israel, 80.  
51 The Egyptianization of Ramesside Palestine (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1993), and BAR  
57 Mohamed Abd el-Maksoud, "Un Monument Du Roi *"/3-shp-r* nhsy à Tell-Haboua (Sinaï Nord)," ASAE 69 (1988) 3-5.  
59 For a full discussion of this suggestion and documenta-tion see my Israel in Egypt, 183-187. In May 1999, I was in Qantara at the office of the Supreme Council for Antiquities, when Dr. Maksoud was presented with a votive statue discovered that day at Hebua. We could clearly read "Tjaru" on it. The publication of this important text is still in progress.  
60 Urk. IV, 647.12. See also, Gardiner, JEA 6 (1920) 99-116.
I


63 This discovery was announced in *Egyptian Archaeology* No. 17 (Autumn 2000) 11 & 32. A preliminary report of the first two seasons of excavations is currently being prepared.


65 Irmgard Hein, "Erste Beobachtungen zur Keramik aus 'Ezbet Helmi," *ÄL IV* [1994] 39-43. In a private conversation, she told me that she believes some of the material could be as late as the time of Amenhotep II.

66 To judge from the reference to Tjaru in the Annals (*Urk. IV*, 647.12)

67 Levant 21, 182-190.


69 *JAOS* 99 (1979) 274.

70 Sources for this campaign include the Tombos stela (*Urk. IV*, 82-86) and the biography of Ahmose pa-Nekhibt (*Urk. IV*, 9.8-14).

71 On the Egyptian Navy during this period, see Torgny S‰ve-Sˆderbergh, *The Navy of the Eighteenth Egyptian Dynasty* (Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift 6, 1946).

72 There is no direct evidence that the prince of Kadesh was an agent of Mitanni, but it is certainly plausible. Redford speaks of Mitanni's "aggressive subversion of Syria" (*Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992] 155).

73 There is no evidence for Megiddo being the place where the garrison was. My suggestion is based upon the fact that the Megiddo was the rallying point of the rebellion. Redford has proposed that the critical lacuna in this line in the Annals could be filled with "Retenu" ("The Historical Retrospective at the Beginning of Thutmose III's Annals," *Festschrift Elmar Edel (Ägypten und Altes Testament* 1, 1979) 338-341. Redford's proposal does not preclude Megiddo as the specific location of the garrison since it would have been considered with Retenu.

74 *Urk. IV*, 647-648.


76 *Urk. IV*, 663.2.

77 *Urk. IV*, 1235.16-19; 662.14-663.1. For a lengthy discussion of the expression *sdf3-*r3yt*, see Scott Morschauser, "The End of the *sdf3*-r3yt 'Oath'," *JARCE* 25 (1988) 93-103. Morschauser rejects the consensus opinion that a fealty oath lies behind the meaning of this expression. Rather, he believes that it has to do with issuing a legal pardon for crimes committed. If this interpretation is correct, it still assumes there was some basis for the Egyptian belief that rebellion against crown interests in Canaan violated an understanding, and required swift action to correct.


79 Lit. "agents of the palace, life prosperity and health."

80 Translation my own; text in *Urk. IV*, 667.10-15.


84 Weinstein, *BASOR* 241 241 [1981]18 believes that "Palace IV" at Tell el-'Ajul may date to as earlier as the late 18th Dynasty; however, he admits that dates for the construction and its demise are not clear. He thinks this building could be the earliest of the so-called "Governor's residences."

85 Nadav Na'aman, *Tel Aviv* 3-4 (1977) 173.

86 This suggestion is based more upon the fact that these sites are mentioned in connection with the first campaign of Thutmose III. The fact that the Egyptian garrison that had been displaced from a point further north redeployed at Sharhen suggests that this city may have housed Egyptian troops prior to the troop withdrawal from a more northern site. Gaza is mentioned as a place where Thutmose III stopped over night and celebrated the anniversary of his coronation while enroute to Megiddo (*Urk. IV*, 648, 9-12). Certainly after the surrender of Megiddo, troops and officials were left behind to oversee the king's affairs.


91 Ibid.


96 *Royal Gifts in the Late Bronze Age, Fourteenth and Thirteenth Centuries BCE* (Beer-Sheva: Studies by the Department of Bible and Ancient Near East, Vol. XIII, 1999).


98 *Urk. IV*, 690.2-5.

99 I.bid. 276.
100 Ibid. 326.
101 Ibid. 272.
102 Ibid. 272.
104 Schulman, JNES 38 (1979) 177-193.
105 Urk. IV. 668.17-669.1.
106 Bleiberg, Gift in Ancient Egypt, 99-100.
107 The contents of the tomb were published by H.E. Winlock, The Treasure of Three Egyptian Princesses (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art Publications, 1948). Schulman (JNES 38 [1979] 182) believes they were "the daughters of minor Syrian rulers."